Researchers and pundits alike view the state of the national economy as a key determinant of vote decisions and election outcomes: voters reward or punish the incumbent party as national economic conditions improve or decline. In an era of rising income inequality, however, national conditions provide relatively poor information to voters about how the incumbent is handling the economy in their interest. We develop a new theoretical perspective on economic voting in which voters look for economic indicators that provide them with information about growth and about how growth will be distributed. We argue that self-interested voters look to economic conditions of people like themselves as indicators of their future economic well being, especially as income inequality has grown. We examine vote share across voters in different income groups in presidential elections from 1952-2012 and in the recent period of rapidly increasing income inequality, 1976-2012. We compare the effect of national economic conditions and economic conditions specific to others situated in the same economic circumstances. We find that the commonly accepted economic voting model performs poorly for voters in the bottom 40% of the income distribution in this recent period. However, voters have not replaced national economic conditions with group specific conditions.
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It is commonly accepted that the state of the national economy is a driving force in both congressional and presidential elections (Kramer 1971 , Tufte 1978 . Every four years we resurrect economic voting models to predict and explain aggregate vote share for president. As the story of electoral reward and punishment usually goes, voters look to the national economy for evidence as to whether the incumbent president (or party) is managing the economy in their interest, and reward or punish the incumbent in accord with this information (Key 1966 , Hibbs 2012 ). Such a model of aggregate voting behavior may make sense in an era in which the proverbial tide lifts -and drops -all boats. But in an era of rising economic inequality it makes little sense as a behavioral story that should apply to all voters.
Consider that while real mean family income has increased by 33.8% since 1976, voters sitting in the bottom income quintile have experienced real income growth of negative 9.4% (absent life-cycle effects), while at the same time their counterparts in the top quintile of the income distribution saw real growth of over 64.1%.
1 Thus we have an apparent paradox: economic voting models enjoy wide repute as predictors of election outcomes at the same time their behavioral motivation should not apply equally to all, or even most, voters. If voters judge incumbents based on the performance of the aggregate economy, those voters at the bottom of the income distribution have ceded their role as "rational god(s) of vengeance and reward" (Key 1964) . The implications of such behavior are stark: politicians have little incentive to consider the fortunes of those who are less well off when crafting economic policy. In this paper we offer a theory to explain economic voting and test a set of hypotheses to predict the economic voting behavior of voters located at different places in the income distribution historically and in recent elections when economic inequality has grown.
What we think we know about economic voting
It is treated as a truism that economic conditions drive election outcomes. Beginning as early as Key (1966) and continuing with such seminal works as Kramer (1971) , Hibbs (1987) , Tufte (1978) , and Fiorina (1981) , and continuing with MacKuen et al. (1992) , and the large body of research by Lewis-Beck (and coauthors) among others, research demonstrates the various ways economic conditions influence voter choice and election outcomes. In general voters are said to observe economic conditions, attribute responsibility for those conditions to the incumbent (or his/her party), and then to vote for the incumbent when conditions are good (or better) and vote them out of office when the economy is poor (or getting worse). In this way voters act as "rational gods of vengeance or reward" and democratic accountability for economic management follows. Literally hundreds of published books, chapters, and articles assessing economic voting debate the mechanism by which this translation occurs: is economic voting forward or backward looking (Clarke & Stewart 1994 , MacKuen, Erikson & Stimson 1992 , Markus 1988 , Norpoth 1996 , is it based on personal or national economic conditions (or something in between) (Kinder & Kiewiet 1979 , Kiewiet 1983 , over what time horizon do voters remember and assess economic conditions (Hibbs 2012 , Bartels 2008 , do different groups of voters respond in like manner to economic conditions (Ansolabehere, Meredith & Snowberg 21012, Bartels 2008 , Kinder, Adams & Gronke 1989 , Kinder, Rosenstone & Hansen 1983 , Krause 1997 , Mutz & Mondak 1997 A further consensus -as demonstrated by forecasts and post election analysis of U.S.
presidential election outcomes published every four years -is that national economic conditions explain a large portion of the variation in vote choice from election to election (Erikson, Wright & McIver 1989 , Fair 1982 , Fair 2002 , Hibbs 1989 , Hibbs 2012 
The rise of economic inequality
The rise of economic inequality, particularly income inequality, in the last 30 plus years is unprecedented since the period prior to the Great Depression. It is also well documented (Bartels 2008 , Hacker & Pierson 2011 , Piketty & Saez 2001 , Saez 2012 . US Census Bureau statistics on the mean family income paths of citizens in each fifth of the income distribution reveal the large income gains in the top fifth of the income distribution relative to those in all other income groups, with the bottom three quintiles experiencing flat income, especially beginning in the 1970s. Those in the fourth income quintile -those in the upper 60 to 80% of the income distribution -saw a steady increase in their incomes.
[ Figure 1 Here]
The average level of income among the richest Americans would have broken away from all other income groups if the growth rates among the different income groups were the same, but this was not the case over much of the years since the mid 1970s. In particular, prior to the 1976 election the poorest Americans experienced larger annual growth rates (5.2%) than the aggregate rate (4.6%), while those with the highest incomes experienced slower growth rates (4.0%). All this changed over the last thirty years -a period of much lower overall annual income growth (0.52%). Those in the bottom quintile experienced negative average growth rates (-0.33%) while those at the top of the income distribution saw average income growth rates of about 1.1%, over three times larger than those in the bottom 20% of the income distribution.
[ Table 1 Here]
We present the growth rates by quintile for the bottom and top quintile, as well as the overall growth rate, in election years in Figure 2 . Things changed for those in these two income groups in particular, relative to each other and relative to the national average. After 1968, 1980 was the only election year in which the income of the bottom quintile grew as fast or faster than those in the top. National income growth outpaced the bottom quintile in both the 1980 and 2000 election years.
[ Figure 2 Here]
The Puzzle
In an era of rising economic inequality voters located in different places in the income distribution experience different economic conditions relative to the national economy and to each other-both in their absolute standing and the average income growth rates they ex-
perience. Yet the standard economic voting model assumes national economic conditions to be the source of economic evaluations of all voters and assumes this has been true across all elections for which survey data is available on voter choice. We argue it makes little sense for voters at the bottom of the income distribution, experiencing relatively flat (or declining) income growth to reward incumbents for national income growth. It makes even less sense for them to reward incumbents for the vast growth in incomes of the richest of Americans, as Bartels has observed they appear to do (2008) . Such behavior ignores how economic growth is distributed -and is thus not very political -and it is particularly problematic as a strategy for electoral accountability in an era of rising economic inequality.
We offer an alternative theory of economic voting in which self-interested voters decide how to cast their vote by assessing both the competence of the president to produce economic growth and how that growth is distributed. This theory makes several predictions.
First, the standard economic voting model will perform relatively poorly for those voters whose experience deviates from national economic conditions, namely those in the bottom (and top), of the income distribution, particularly in elections taking place since the mid 1970s when the rise in economic inequality begins. Second, voters will respond more to economic measures that reflect their own experience than to national economic conditions.
An Alternative Theory of Economic Voting
We have a theory about why people are economic voters. They believe that they are choosing between presidential candidates who would produce different economic outcomes. One economically based reason to prefer one presidential candidate over another is to believe that one candidate has some level of competence more likely to produce stronger economic growth. However, as politics is about 'who gets what', a 'better' reason to prefer one presidential candidate is if that candidate will generate a level of growth for the voter larger than the other candidate. And that level of growth for the voter is a combination of an overall growth rate, and the share of the growth rate that goes towards the voter. So a voter believes that a president produces a level of growth, and a distribution of that growth among persons in the economy and rewards or punishes the incumbent based on his or her assessment of how well the incumbent has generated economic growth in his or her interest.
In practice, the voter infers the incumbent president's type (i.e, the president's combination of competence and distributional impact) by observing: a) the overall growth rate of the economy (the net change in total production); and b) the change in income of persons predict how well the voter will fare economically, the relevant group is those located at a similar place in the income distribution. But the group relevant to the voter could be based on his or her skill level, the region of the country in which he or she lives, or the industry in which the voter works, or the race of the voter, for example. The economic performance of one's group in our story serves as a measurement device, as an instrument for the voter to measure the effect of economic performance on the voter. Were it not for the assorted idiosyncratic factors associated with a voter's personal change in economic fortune, there would be no reason, according to our theory, for the voter to look at the economic performance of any group. Groups allow the voter to observe a relevant measure of how the economy is performing and serve as a way for the researcher to measure how the economy is performing in a way that is relevant to the voter. Thus voters look to group performance not as a filter as suggested by the early voting literature (Campbell et al. 1960) and not out of a sense of social justice or altruism as suggested by Kinder et al. (1989) and Mutz and Mondak (1997) but out of self-interest.
In our theory voters are both self-interested and in some sense more sophisticated than previously posited economic voters: our economic voters are not naive enough to believe that aggregate economic growth necessarily implies that they themselves will benefit. And, they are sophisticated enough to know that under different presidents the pattern of distribution of economic growth may differ in predictable ways. We of course need to explain how they would make such predictions.
2
So while the group-perspective in the early voting literature was replaced by a model of an individualistic cost-benefit calculator by Fiorina (1981) in Retrospective Voting in American National Elections, the calculator has generally been assumed to follow a rather naive algorithim. To be blunt, we argue that the rational calculator was assumed to calculate the wrong quantity. We think that rational, utility maximizing voters could not be so ignorant as to look at only a single measure of economic growth and assume that this is the best available indicator of how well the incumbent is managing the economy in their interest. We believe this is particularly true in a period of increasing economic inequality.
As we demonstrated in the figures and tables above, the voter does not need a complex model of the United States macro-economy to know that economic growth could be quite robust for some groups and in the national economy, while growth is flat (or negative) for other groups.
We can summarize the ground we have covered thus far as follows. One, we propose a mechanism for economic voting in which voters use information about the economic performance of groups to identify the type of incumbent in office and thus predict the impact of that incumbent on the voter's own economic future. Voters then use this information to reward or punish incumbents or their party. Two, we have identified income groups as important relevant groups and measure group economic performance using the mean income growth rate of individuals in different places in the income distribution and assume that the voters are informed in some way about group economic performance. Below, we offer testable implications of the theory that voters are not looking at the entire economy, but rather the portion of the economy that best measures how the economy is performing relative to their own interest and thus gives them the best predictor of the incumbent's type and whether or not they wish to choose to support the incumbent or his party.
Notation and Measurement
In the usual model of economic voting, the voters observe national economic output in the current and previous periods (Y t and Y t−1 ), and thus the growth rate. The voter uses these 2 observations to infer, or update, the competence of the party in power, call it party 1 (c 1 ):
the growth rate they can deliver. Based on previous observations, the voter has a belief about the competence of party 2 (c 2 ). If c 1 < c 2 then the voter votes for party 2.
But if politics is about who gets what, then this is a view of a very non-political voter.
The distribution of Y t should come into play in the voting choice. Assume that we have two groups of fixed size in society, the poor and the rich. The income of the j th group, in this case the poor, would be given by Y t × s j , where s j is the proportion of income going to the j th group. A Rawlsian voter would be trying to maximize this product (Rawls 1971) . And a poor voter trying to maximize their own income would also be trying to maximize this product. To repeat, we argue that self-interested and rational voters do not look to the national economy as the best indicator of future economic benefit to expect from the incumbent, in particular as income inequality has risen. In essence, growth is not enough information for any given voter's economic future. Instead, we argue that voters will look for economic indicators that provide them with information about growth and about how growth will be distributed, about s j . People care not just about how big the economic pie is (Y ), but as in all politics, they care about what part of it they get (Y * s j ). And this should affect vote choice and, more generally, evaluations of the incumbent.
Then how should the economy predict voters' vote-choices? To answer this question, we consider whether and how individuals that are situated at different places in the economy respond to different aspects of the economy. If voters care about the distribution of economic gains (losses), then voters in different income groups should respond differently to national conditions, they should respond to income growth in their income group as indicators of how the president is handling the economy in the voter's interest, and they should respond less to national economic conditions in the recent period of rising income inequality as Y × s j has diverged across income groups.
There are many ways for individuals to see themselves situated in the national economy or equivalently, many ways to define the set that j is indexing. Voters might perceive their self interest by looking at the condition of citizens at similar places in the income distribution (poor versus rich), with similar skills (eligible for similar kinds of and similar paying jobs), in similar occupations or industries, or in the same state or region. We assume that voters assess their economic future by looking at how others in these groups are doing. If they are doing well, then the voter's best information is that the president is managing the economy to distribute growth to the voter's group and ultimately to benefit the voter; Y * s j for the incumbent president is larger than the anticipated Y * s j of the opposition party candidate.
Voters may perceive that indicators of their self interest lie in the economic well being of any or some combination of these groups. In this paper, we consider income distribution.
Empirical Implications
Voters looking for information about how the president is managing the economy in their self interest need economic information. And if voters assess their economic self interest by looking at the conditions of people in their income bracket, the most obvious way to assess our theory is by looking at the effects of increased per capita income going to a citizen's income group or comparing the effects of national income on each income group.
Wherever individuals are situated in the economy, economic indicators that provide information to voters about a president's distributional type will affect members of different groups in different ways. This means that models of elections which limit economic effects to the effects of the national economy can tell only part of the story. In essence, the heterogeneity of the effects of the economy on voters preferences is assumed away in models of aggregate vote shares based on changes in the aggregate economy. This is not a problem if there is little variance between the relative economic fortunes of different groups from year to year. But in times of rising inequality, we expect such a model to perform quite poorly as changes in aggregate economic performance would become much poorer proxys for changes in group economic performance.
This suggests the first hypothesis that we test below. Since 1976, as income inequality has risen, we expect voters in different income groups will be less responsive to the state of the national economy than they were prior to 1976. And this should be more true for voters who's level of economic performance diverged the most from aggregate national economic performance. Thus we expect smaller coefficients on aggregate income in the post 1976 period prior to the earlier period. And we expect models based on the national economy to simply fit worse post 1976 than during the earlier period.
The theory also suggests that models of aggregate economic performance should vary in their utility across voters in different income groups. For those voters who's group is experiencing income changes very different from aggregate economic performance, aggregate economic performance should be a poor predictor of voting behavior. And thus we should see relatively small coefficients on aggregate economic change, and a relatively poor fit for the models for these groups.
But an even more direct empirical implication of the theory we have stated is that group economic performance should be a more powerful predictor of vote share than should national economic performance. So we expect models using group economic performance as explanatory variables to outperform models using aggregate economic performance as explanatory variables. And this should be seen in larger coefficients on group economic performance than aggregate economic performance. And it should be seen in better fit of models based on group economic performance than models based on aggregate economic performance.
And obviously the superiority of group economic performance over aggregate economic performance should be most pronounced in the post 1976 period when inequality rose. Thus we also test the two hypotheses regarding this (comparing size of coefficients and fit of models) separately for the period 1976 thru 2012. Since as we have seen group economic performance and aggregate economic performance were more highly correlated in the 1952-1976 period, it would be harder to observe differences in the performance of the variables during that period.
Design
We offer three ways that we might test our hypotheses. First, at the aggregate level, we can separately model the presidential vote share of each group as a function of national economic indicators. And we can estimate these models for the full span of elections available and for the subset of elections occurring with the rise of economic inequality. These models look like typical models of aggregate vote-share, but by separately estimating them on j subgroups of the electorate, we allow for the self-interested heterogeneity in responsiveness to the economy that our theory predicts. The form of the vote share model is given by:
where:
• V j,t is the vote share of the j th group at time t.
• X t is a set of national economic measures whose effects may be measured in changes or levels.
• W t,j is a set of variables describing non-economic factors affecting the vote share for the j th group.
This design allows us to test our first two hypothesis: that these aggregate economic indicators perform less well in the recent era. In particular we can compare the effect size and fit of measures of the national aggregate economic performance over the full period of the data andwith the effect size and fit of the same models for elections in the new era of rising inequality, here from 1976 to 2012.
The second design strategy is to separately model vote share of each group as a function of group specific economic indicators, either alone or in combination with aggregate measures.
• V j,t is the approval rating of the j th group at time t.
• Z j,t is a set of group specific measures of the economy, such as group income growth.
The X and Z may be the same indicators, as in the example that follows where we consider income growth in the aggregate and by subgroup.
Here the theoretical linkage between the group's share of the economic pie and our measure of the group's distributional spoils is more direct. In the first strategy, we assume the national measures provide different information to different voters about their group's share of the economic pie, and test whether the relevance of national measures varies in predictable ways. In this design, the measurement is exactly the distributional spoils (Z j,t ).
Each group's vote shares are a function of economic indicators that vary by group and over time. We can thus assess the self interest hypothesis by noting the effect of these group specific measures. The data requirements to estimate this model are much harder to satisfy than for the first specification. Here we need to find economic measures specific to identifiable groups.
The final design strategy is to model individual vote choice as a function of either: a) group specific economic indicators or; b) interactions involving group identifiers and national economic conditions. Thus the economic measures, whose effects we expect to vary across groups, enter the individual level model in much the same way as in the aggregate level models. We include measures of the national economy interacted with the group-specific characteristics of each individual respondent. For instance, we can allow the effect of real disposable income to be unique for individuals with higher incomes (in a particular group j) by including an interaction term for real disposable income with high income. 4 And we include the appropriate group-level economic measures on the right hand side for each respondent. For example, we include the mean growth in income of persons in the respondent's income group.
• V i,j,t is the vote of the i th respondent at time t, who is a member of group j.
• W i is a set of variables measuring politically relevant characteristics of the i th individual.
• I j,t is an indicator of an individual's group, j.
• Z j,t is a set of group specific measures of the economy whose effects may be measured in changes or levels and is matched to each individual i according to his or her group, j.
Because income and other group specific economic measures vary both over time and by group, we can assess self interest and heterogeneity by assessing the significance of β 3 , the coefficient of the group-specific economic measures. In addition, the inclusion of interaction effects between aggregate economic measures and the respondent's group membership allows us to test for differential responses to the same measures and thus also provides information on the validity of our theory.
This strategy requires pooling individual survey data over time, to ensure variation in national economic indicators. This limits the analysis to groups and economic indicators easily identified in individual level survey data. But it offers three advantages over the macro level strategy. First, it allows us to take advantage of the wealth of information available and relevant to individual political evaluations. Second, it allows us to directly model vote choice, even with survey data on few presidential elections. Third, it allows us to directly assess individual level behavior.
In the analysis below, we follow the aggregate level strategies and model vote share received by the incumbent president's party. We describe the data in the next section, then present our findings. we assign respondents to a quintile by assuming that when survey income categories straddle census groups respondents are distributed uniformly across the two straddled categories and assign them randomly to a quintile. These vote share time series are paired with group income growth rates and used to test our theory using the first and second modeling strategy.
National and Group Specific Economic Measures X t and Z j,t
We focus our attention in this paper on income growth as a single measure of the performance of the national economy. Many scholars have used income as a single scalar indicator of the health of the national economy (Chappell Jr & Keech 1985 , Hibbs 2012 , Kernell 1978 We estimate the weight voters attach to national income growth over the last four years using the following equation from Hibbs (2012):
where X is the annualized growth rate of aggregate real mean family, X t = (
We estimated the weight to be 0.77, a rate similar to those in Hibbs's various articles and to Erikson (1989) , both of which relied on per capita disposable income growth and covered different election years. The estimate appears to be quite robust. The discount rate is quite steep, suggesting voters have shore memory when it comes to income growth.
We create a similar measure of income growth, our Z jt , for each income quintile, with one distinction. We have the data annually rather than by quarters. We then take the quarterly discount rate, translate it into an annual rate, and apply this weight to national income growth and to quintile income growth. We are thus assuming that the poorest and richest Americans discount the past at similar rates, an assumption we think reasonable (but that we will test in the future).
We present the correlations between the quintile-specific measure of weighted average income and the aggregate measure of weighted average income in election years over two time periods. First we present the correlations over the full period of our analysis (1952-2012, then we present the correlation over the recent period of rising income inequality . (See Table 2 .) In the full period the income growth of the top and bottom quintiles have the smallest correlation with aggregate income growth and the correlation in income growth between these two time series is approximately 0.80. Over the recent period (the last 10 elections) the experience of the bottom quintile correlates the weakest with aggregate income growth (0.88), but now the top quintile is more highly correlated with the aggregate (0.94). Once again among the quintile income growth pairs, the correlation between the top and the bottom of the income distribution is the lowest (0.86).
[ Table 2 Here]
We use income growth as direct measures of the realized economic gains of respondents in each group, so for the j th group, income growth for that group represents Y * s j . They provide the amount of income growth -the economic spoils -groups of citizens receive under a particular administration. In turn, they provide information about the president's distributional type and allow us to test our hypotheses.
National and group specific weighted income growth enter the aggregate models as time series that are matched with the vote share of each income group. We can then do two things. First, we can then compare the effects of national income growth and their contribution to fit over the full span of elections with those since 1976, the first election after the dramatic rise in inequality began. This provides a direct test of our first hypotheses:
the standard economic voting model will perform less well for voters in each quintile in the last 10 elections than over the full time period. Second, we can assess the effect of an income group's income growth in these same two time periods and a) compare the size of the effects and the contribution to model fit of group performance to that of national economic conditions in the two periods and b) compare the relative performance of national and group specific weighted income growth in the two periods. This will provide a direct test of our second hypothesis that voters assess the president's management of the economy in terms of their self interest.
Military Casualties and the Party in the White House
Our models of vote share include two additional variables. The first of these is the cumulative number of US military fatalities overseas during the incumbent's term. The variable is a standard bearer in time series models of vote choice. Fatalities account for the effect of "peace" on voter choice; as they go up, the incumbent's vote share should go down. The second variable we include in our models is the party of the incumbent. This variable accounts for the tendency for poorer voters to vote Democratic and richer voters to vote Republican or simply that there are more Democrats in the bottom of the income distribution than in the top. Including a variable that identifies the party in the White House controls for this effect. Whereas with aggregate vote models, party is not conditioned on -with vote models dissagregated by income, we need to condition on the different baseline voting rates for each party that people in different income groups have.
Findings
In Table 3 [ Table 3 About Here]
According to our theory, we also expect the performance of the model based on aggregate economic performance to vary across groups. However, we note that in both the top and bottom sections of Table 3 In Table 4 we present results of an identical model, except that here we utilize the growth for the individual income quintile as the measure of economic performance. We expect the coefficients for quintile income growth presented here to be larger than the corresponding coefficients for aggregate income growth presented in Table 3 . However, they are not. For each quintile, the coefficients of quintile income growth are approximately the same size as the coefficient of aggregate income growth. Thus we find no support for our theory in this test. However, given the high level of correlation between our two right-hand side candidate variables, it is not too surprising that we can not discern differences in their effects. And, we see the same equivalence when comparing the fit of the two competing measures of economic growth.
[ Table 4 About Here]
Since quintile income growth and aggregate income growth are less correlated in the post-1976 period for quintiles 1 through 4, we examined the same comparisons for the latter period. However, even in the period of higher levels of inequality, we were unable to distinguish between the effect of changes in quintile income growth and changes in aggregate income growth. We discuss the implications of this below.
We note that the impact of Democratic Incumbency is higher in the post-1976 period for those in the bottom quintile . There are two possible explanationsn for this. The first is that there are more Democrats in the bottom quintile now than in the past. The second is that poor voters may have learned that Democrats provide higher relative growth rates for poor voters than do Republicans.
Conclusion and Future Research
We began by pointing out a puzzle: standard economic theories of voting should simply not work as well during times when aggregate economic measures are poor proxies for the economic performance of many voters. We offered a theory of economic voting that we think is more appropriate for circumstances of rising economic inequality. And consistent with our theory, we demonstrated that standard economic models do perform poorly during the period rising income inequality, especially for the poorest voters who have experienced no economic growth during a period when the aggregate economy did grow (albeit more slowly than it had been growing previously).
We offered a theory which suggests a behavioral mechanism for economic voting that should be captured by measuring growth in a way that is more applicable to the voters' group economic performance. We did not however find that using the economic growth of the quintile directly as a predictor of presidential voting worked better than using aggregate economic growth.
Why did we fail to find that quintile income growth better predicts voting behavior than aggregate income growth? We think the obvious candidate is that voters simply do not know quintile income growth (which is not widely reported in the media, nor even available in a very timely manner); whereas aggregate growth measures are reported regularly by the media. Thus this suggests examining determinants of economic perception. We know that the media reporting of the economy has an impact on economic perceptions. It may be that media coverage of the economy is biased towards either the economic performance of those at the top, or that the media coverage is based only on aggregate economic information.
These are questions we intend to pursue in future research. All income growth rates are computed by the authors based on mean family income data from the US Census Bureau. All income growth rates are computed from the authors based on mean family income data from the US Census Bureau. The weighted income growth rates are calculated based on an annual decay rate of λ = 0.77. See the text for details on the estimation of λ. Income growth is a weighted average of annualized mean family national income growth rates over the term. The weight is based on an annual decay rate of λ = 0.77. See the text for details on the estimation of λ. Income data is from the US Census Bureau. Absolute Reduction in Error is in comparison to a model of incumbent vote share as a function of the number of cumulative fatalities in overseas conflict over the last four years and the party of the incumbent president. growth is a weighted average of annualized mean family income growth rats in the quintile over the term. The weight is based on an annual decay rate of λ = 0.77. See the text for details on the estimation of λ. Income data is from the US Census Bureau. Absolute Reduction in Error is in comparison to a model of incumbent vote share as a function of the number of cumulative fatalities in overseas conflict over the last four years and the party of the incumbent president.
